In this paper I apply the concept of _inter-Model Inconsistency in Set Theory_ (MIST), introduced by Carolin Antos (this volume), to select positions in the current universe-multiverse debate in philosophy of set theory: I reinterpret H. Woodin’s _Ultimate L_, J. D. Hamkins’ multiverse, S.-D. Friedman’s hyperuniverse and the algebraic multiverse as normative strategies to deal with the situation of de facto inconsistency toleration in set theory as described by MIST. In particular, my aim is to situate these positions on the (...) spectrum from inconsistency avoidance to inconsistency toleration. By doing so, I connect a debate in philosophy of set theory with a debate in philosophy of science about the role of inconsistencies in the natural sciences. While there are important differences, like the lack of threatening explosive inferences, I show how specific philosophical positions in the philosophy of set theory can be interpreted as reactions to a state of inconsistency similar to analogous reactions studied in the philosophy of science literature. My hope is that this transfer operation from philosophy of science to mathematics sheds a new light on the current discussion in philosophy of set theory; and that it can help to bring philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science closer together. (shrink)

. This paper examines the association between long-term compensation and corporate social responsibility for 90 publicly traded Canadian firms. Social responsibility is considered to include concerns for social factors and the environment, 564-578; Kane, E. J., 341-359). Long-term compensation attempts to focus executives efforts on optimizing the longer term, which should direct their attention to factors traditionally associated with socially responsible executives. As hypothesized, we found a significant relationship between the long-term compensation and total CSR weakness as well as the (...) product/environmental weakness dimension of CSR. In addition, we found a marginally significant relationship between long-term compensation and total corporate responsibility. Our findings are that executives long-term compensation is associated with a firms environmental actions, and that firms that utilize long-term compensation are more likely to mitigate product/environment weaknesses than those that do not. Implications for practice and research are discussed. (shrink)

Canada has a marked shortfall between the supply and demand for kidneys for transplantation. Median wait times for deceased donor kidney transplantation vary from 5.8 years in British Columbia, 5.2 years in Manitoba and 4.5 years in Ontario to a little over 2 years in Quebec and Nova Scotia. Living donation provides a viable option for some, but not all people. Consequently, a small number of people travel abroad to undergo kidney transplantation by commercial means. The extent to which they (...) are aware of the potential risks to their health and the health of the kidney vendors is unclear. Travel abroad to obtain a kidney commercially i.e. transplant tourism (TT), raises ethical issues which include the exploitation of the poor, uncertainty of donor informed consent to nephrectomy, poor clinical care and lack of follow up for the donor, commodification of the body and inequity of access to medical care for donors. Also, TT widens socioeconomic disparities in access to transplantation, differing from the Canadian system of universal coverage for healthcare. The Canadian transplant community has discussed how to respond to patients who plan to travel abroad for TT or return with a purchased kidney. Unease rests in the tension between the duty to care for legitimate Canadian residents and the unwillingness to enable TT. This paper discusses three anonymized cases and the Canadian responses to TT as recorded in academic literature and a formal statement by relevant professional bodies. (shrink)

My purpose in what follows is not so much to defend the basic principle of utilitarianism as to indicate the form of it which seems most promising as a basic moral and political position. I shall take the principle of utility as offering a criterion for two different sorts of evaluation: first, the merits of acts of government, social policies, and social institutions, and secondly, the ultimate moral evaluation of the actions of individuals. I do not take it as implying (...) that the individual should live his life on the basis of constant evaluations of this sort. For there are different levels of decision making each with its appropriate criteria. For example, we each inevitably make many of our decisions from the point of view of our own personal self-fulfilment and this cannot regularly take a directly utilitarian form, nor should the utilitarian want it to do so. His claim is at most that we should sometimes review our life from the point of view of a kind of impersonal moral truth of a universalistic utilitarian character. (shrink)

The period of the mid-1920s to the mid-1980s was a portentous period for Soviet psychology. As this period recedes into the past, the figure of L. S. Vygotskii rises more and more before us. Vygotskii died of tuberculosis when not quite 37 years old. He was a psychologist for only 10 years, and it was only in the last 6 of these that he did the work we now associate with his name. During those brief years Vygotskii wrote over 120 (...) works, including more than 10 large books. His was a short life — filled with inspired, indefatigable, and heroic work. A significant part of his written work has remained unpublished and indeed much of it remained unfinished. A seven-volume collection of Vygotskii's work is currently underway, and even this will not contain everything he wrote. The final volume of this collection will include his articles "The Sense of the Psychological Crisis" and "Spinoza's Theory of the Passions.". (shrink)

Jean Philiponus s'est toujours opposé à la notion nestorienne des anges servant les hommes à la place de Dieu. Jean Philiponus s'inscrit dans le courant égyptien critique de la fin du VIe siècle de certains récits apocryphes des anges dans l'univers primitif. L'argumentation de Philoponus est anti-dyophysite. Il s'attache à démontrer que l'univers que nous percevons est peuplé d'entités non corporelles puissantes, au service de Dieu et dont le rôle est de faire passer des messages aux êtres humains. Ces entités (...) ont été créées par le Dieu trinitaire avant l'acte divin de création. (shrink)

Let A₁,..., An, An+1 be a finite sequence of algebras of sets given on a set X, $\cup _{k=1}^{n}{\cal A}_{k}\neq \germ{P}(X)$, with more than $\frac{4}{3}n$ pairwise disjoint sets not belonging to An+1. It was shown in [4] and [5] that in this case $\cup _{k=1}^{n+1}{\cal A}_{k}\neq \germ{P}(X)$. Let us consider, instead An+1, a finite sequence of algebras An+1,..., An+l. It turns out that if for each natural i ≤ l there exist no less than $\frac{4}{3}(n+l)-\frac{l}{24}$ pairwise disjoint sets not belonging (...) to An+i, then $\cup _{k=1}^{n+1}{\cal A}_{k}\neq \germ{P}(X)$. But if l ≥ 195 and if for each natural i ≤ l there exist no less than $\frac{4}{3}(n+l)-\frac{l}{15}$ pairwise disjoint sets not belonging to An+i, then $\cup _{k=1}^{n+1}{\cal A}_{k}\neq \germ{P}(X)$. After consideration of finite sequences of algebras, it is natural to consider countable sequences of algebras. We obtained two essentially important theorems on a countable sequence of almost σ-algebras (the concept of almost σ-algebra was introduced in [4]). (shrink)

It has been more than sixty years since R. D. Collison Black published his Economic Thought and the Irish Question, a book which ever since has been widely regarded as a classic in the history of e...

I defend the view that propositional knowledge can be defined as follows: A knows that p if and only if A believes that p because p. Spelling out the meaning of 'because' in this formula results in a causal-explanatory view of knowledge.

The relationship between Bentham's ‘enunciative principle’ and his ‘censorial principle’ is famously problematic. The problem's solution is that each person has an overwhelming interest in living in a community in which they, like others, are liable to punishment for behaviour condemned by the censorial principle either by the institutions of the state or by the tribunal of public opinion. The senses in which Bentham did and did not think everyone selfish are examined, and a less problematic form of psychological hedonism (...) than Bentham's is proposed. (shrink)

As the editor noted in the last number Freddie Ayer, or Professor Sir Alfred Ayer, played a considerable part in launching the vast enterprise of the Bentham edition. It is fitting, therefore, that something be said in Utilitas about his achievement as a philosopher and the extent to which he falls within the same broad empiricist and utilitarian tradition to which Bentham and J. S. Mill belonged.

The increasing demand for horticultural products for nutritional and economic purposes by lesser developed countries (LDC's) is well-documented. Technological demands of the LDC's producing horticultural products is also increasing. Pesticide use is an integral component of most agricultural production, yet chemicals are often supplied without supplemental information vital for their safe and efficient implementation. Illiteracy rates in developing countries are high, making pesticide education even more challenging. For women, who perform a significant share of agricultural tasks, illiteracy rates are even (...) higher than for men. The dilemma exists of how a developing country can improve its nutritional and economic situation without giving consideration to social and environmental consequences. (shrink)

If skepticism is once again fashionable, then much of the credit must go to Peter Unger who gives a sustained defense of an ultra-pyrrhonian position in his book, Ignorance: A case for Skepticism. Starting with a version of the traditional argument that we know nothing about the external world, Unger plunges deeper into skeptical waters by next arguing that there is at most hardly anything which we know to be so; and he scarcely pauses before proceeding to defend the stronger (...) conclusion of ‘universal ignorance,’ the thesis that nobody ever knows anything to be the case. I view Unger's thesis and the arguments that led him to it as a challenge to be overcome, not by an appeal to dogmatism - which Unger sees as the only alternative to skepticism - but by recourse to hard-biting arguments of the sort in which Unger himself puts his faith. In what follows I shall attempt to restate Unger's three main skeptical arguments with a view to showing that their bite is not nearly so hard as he imagines. (shrink)